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3.2.1 Market entry through greenfieldAbstract
Policy makers often decide to liberalize foreign bank entry but at the same time
restrict the mode of entry. We study how di®erent entry modes a®ect the interest
rate for loans in a model in which domestic banks possess private information about
their incumbent clients but foreign banks have better screening skills. Our model
predicts that competition is stronger if market entry occurs through a green¯eld
investment and therefore domestic banks' interest rates are lower. We ¯nd empirical
support for our results for a sample of banks from 10 transition countries of Eastern
Europe for the period 1995-2003.
Keywords: Banking, Foreign Entry, Mode of Entry, Interest Rate, Asymmetric
Information
JEL-Classi¯cation: G21, D4, L31
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Empirical evidence shows that in emerging markets, foreign banks are more proﬁtable
and more eﬃcient than domestic banks (Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (2000), Bonin,
Hasan and Wachtel (2005), Martinez Peria and Mody (2004)), while being less proﬁtable
in more developed countries (Claessens, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (2001)). These
contrasting ﬁndings heat the debate as to what extent foreign bank entry beneﬁts cus-
tomers. Traditional industrial organization literature predicts that bank entry leads to
more competition which should ultimately help borrowers. Indeed, foreign bank presence
in emerging countries increases access to loans, especially for large and transparent ﬁrms
(Mian (2006a), Giannetti and Ongena (2005), Clarke, Cull and Martinez Peria (2001)).
Diﬀerences in information distribution (soft versus hard information) between domestic
and foreign banks may however obstruct a likewise impact on lending to small and more
opaque ﬁrms (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004)). These ﬁrms are often captured by their
domestic bank and barred from foreign lending. To date, the impact of the mode of
foreign bank entry - foreign acquisition versus foreign de novo or greenﬁeld investment -
on the initial distribution of information and the consequent degree of competition and
lending conditions remains largely ignored.
Governments all over the world have expressed their concerns about foreign banks’
cherry picking strategies by keeping up (sometimes illegal) barriers to entry. Foreign
banks are sometimes deprived of gaining majority stakes in private domestic banks.
Vice versa, domestic policy makers have been reluctant to grant bank licenses that allow
foreign investors to start a de novo bank. While foreign de novo banks are more proﬁtable
and eﬃcient than foreign acquired banks (Martinez Peria and Mody (2004), Majnoni,
Shankar and V` arhegyi (2003)), it remains unclear whether the mode of entry impacts
domestic bank lending conditions and competition as a whole alike. This is especially
important for emerging markets where ﬁrms heavily depend on bank ﬁnancing.
In this paper we try to ﬁll this void. We provide a theoretical framework that out-
lines how the distribution of information between foreign and domestic banks may diﬀer
depending on the mode of entry. Consequently, this will inﬂuence the degree of competi-
tion and the average lending rate for borrowers. The predictions of the model are tested
using data on entry modes of foreign banks in 10 Eastern European countries. Because
Eastern Europe witnessed a dramatic increase in foreign bank entry over the past decade
(foreign bank market shares increased from approximately 10 percent in 1995 to almost
70 percent in 2003), it provides a unique laboratory for analyzing the impact of the mode
of foreign bank entry on bank interest rates.
The crucial diﬀerence between foreign and domestic banks is their aptitude to acquire
information. Domestic banks possess information about their incumbent ﬁrms. Both the
domestic and the foreign bank have the same degree of information about ﬁrms which
have just entered the credit market. However, foreign banks have better screening skills
5
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July 2006than the domestic bank. A foreign bank enters through a greenﬁeld investment only if
its advantage in screening new applicant ﬁrms compensates its disadvantage of having no
information about incumbent ﬁrms. If a foreign bank enters via acquisition, it acquires
a credit portfolio that contains information about the quality of incumbent ﬁrms. In
addition, the acquired bank can generate information by screening applicants. The mode
of entry thus determines the distribution of information between foreign and domestic
banks, which aﬀects the degree of competition. Therefore, the mode of entry generates a
diﬀerential “competition eﬀect”. Since we subsequently empirically analyze the lending
rate for borrowers, we take into account how a bank’s portfolio composition with respect
to new applicants and incumbent ﬁrms depends on the mode of entry. In contrast to new
applicants, successful incumbent ﬁrms can signal their type. For these ﬁrms, competition
drives down the interest rate. Thus, the higher the share of successful incumbent ﬁrms,
the lower will be the average lending rate demanded by acquired banks. We refer to this
eﬀect as the “portfolio composition eﬀect”.
Our analysis provides three main results. First, domestic banks demand higher lend-
ing rates than foreign banks from new applicants. Since a foreign bank will enter only if
it is better in generating information, it can undercut the domestic bank’s lending rate.
Second, competition is stronger when a foreign bank enters via a greenﬁeld investment
rather than by acquiring an existing bank. The stronger the information advantage of
the foreign bank, the weaker the position of the domestic bank, and the higher will be
the domestic bank’s lending rate. A higher interest rate by the domestic bank gives the
foreign bank scope to extract rents from borrowers. Thus, the competition eﬀect is more
pronounced in the case of entry through a greenﬁeld investment. Third, the average
lending rates of foreign and domestic banks depend on their portfolio composition. In-
cumbent ﬁrms - on which domestic and acquired banks have soft information - face a
hold-up problem because they cannot signal their type. However, the higher the share
of successful incumbent ﬁrms that are able to signal their type, the lower will be the
average lending rate demanded by acquired banks.
We use bank balance sheets to derive lending rates for a panel of 200 banks in 10
Eastern European countries for the period 1995-2003. Using panel data estimation meth-
ods, we ﬁnd empirical support for our results. Consistent with previous literature, we
ﬁnd that foreign bank presence negatively impacts bank interest rates. Foreign banks,
on average, charge lower lending rates - between 1.33 and 1.48 percent less than their
domestic counterparts. By including (non-linear) age dynamics into our regression equa-
tion, we ﬁnd that although greenﬁeld banks charge higher interest rates on average, they
signiﬁcantly reduce their interest rates over the years following entry. We further ﬁnd
indications of a diﬀerential competition eﬀect. Depending on the mode of entry, domes-
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Empirical evidence shows that in emerging markets, foreign banks are more pro¯table
and more e±cient than domestic banks (DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and Huizinga (2000), Bonin,
Hasan and Wachtel (2005), Martinez Peria and Mody (2004)), while being less pro¯table
in more developed countries (Claessens, DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and Huizinga (2001)). These
contrasting ¯ndings heat the debate as to what extent foreign bank entry bene¯ts cus-
tomers. Traditional industrial organization literature predicts that bank entry leads to
more competition which should ultimately help borrowers. Indeed, foreign bank presence
in emerging countries increases access to loans, especially for large and transparent ¯rms
(Mian (2006a), Giannetti and Ongena (2005), Clarke, Cull and Martinez Peria (2001)).
Di®erences in information distribution (soft versus hard information) between domestic
and foreign banks may however obstruct a likewise impact on lending to small and more
opaque ¯rms (Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2004)). These ¯rms are often captured by their
domestic bank and barred from foreign lending. To date, the impact of the mode of
foreign bank entry - foreign acquisition versus foreign de novo or green¯eld investment -
on the initial distribution of information and the consequent degree of competition and
lending conditions remains largely ignored.
Governments all over the world have expressed their concerns about foreign banks'
cherry picking strategies by keeping up (sometimes illegal) barriers to entry. Foreign
banks are sometimes deprived of gaining majority stakes in private domestic banks.
Vice versa, domestic policy makers have been reluctant to grant bank licenses that allow
foreign investors to start a de novo bank. While foreign de novo banks are more pro¯table
and e±cient than foreign acquired banks (Martinez Peria and Mody (2004), Majnoni,
Shankar and Vµ arhegyi (2003)), it remains unclear whether the mode of entry impacts
domestic bank lending conditions and competition as a whole alike. This is especially
important for emerging markets where ¯rms heavily depend on bank ¯nancing.
In this paper we try to ¯ll this void. We provide a theoretical framework that out-
lines how the distribution of information between foreign and domestic banks may di®er
depending on the mode of entry. Consequently, this will in°uence the degree of competi-
tion and the average lending rate for borrowers. The predictions of the model are tested
using data on entry modes of foreign banks in 10 Eastern European countries. Because
Eastern Europe witnessed a dramatic increase in foreign bank entry over the past decade
(foreign bank market shares increased from approximately 10 percent in 1995 to almost
70 percent in 2003), it provides a unique laboratory for analyzing the impact of the mode
of foreign bank entry on bank interest rates.
The crucial di®erence between foreign and domestic banks is their aptitude to acquire
information. Domestic banks possess information about their incumbent ¯rms. Both the
domestic and the foreign bank have the same degree of information about ¯rms which
have just entered the credit market. However, foreign banks have better screening skills
than the domestic bank. A foreign bank enters through a green¯eld investment only if
its advantage in screening new applicant ¯rms compensates its disadvantage of having no
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July 2006information about incumbent ¯rms. If a foreign bank enters via acquisition, it acquires
a credit portfolio that contains information about the quality of incumbent ¯rms. In
addition, the acquired bank can generate information by screening applicants. The mode
of entry thus determines the distribution of information between foreign and domestic
banks, which a®ects the degree of competition. Therefore, the mode of entry generates a
di®erential \competition e®ect". Since we subsequently empirically analyze the lending
rate for borrowers, we take into account how a bank's portfolio composition with respect
to new applicants and incumbent ¯rms depends on the mode of entry. In contrast to new
applicants, successful incumbent ¯rms can signal their type. For these ¯rms, competition
drives down the interest rate. Thus, the higher the share of successful incumbent ¯rms,
the lower will be the average lending rate demanded by acquired banks. We refer to this
e®ect as the \portfolio composition e®ect".
Our analysis provides three main results. First, domestic banks demand higher lend-
ing rates than foreign banks from new applicants. Since a foreign bank will enter only if
it is better in generating information, it can undercut the domestic bank's lending rate.
Second, competition is stronger when a foreign bank enters via a green¯eld investment
rather than by acquiring an existing bank. The stronger the information advantage of
the foreign bank, the weaker the position of the domestic bank, and the higher will be
the domestic bank's lending rate. A higher interest rate by the domestic bank gives the
foreign bank scope to extract rents from borrowers. Thus, the competition e®ect is more
pronounced in the case of entry through a green¯eld investment. Third, the average
lending rates of foreign and domestic banks depend on their portfolio composition. In-
cumbent ¯rms - on which domestic and acquired banks have soft information - face a
hold-up problem because they cannot signal their type. However, the higher the share
of successful incumbent ¯rms that are able to signal their type, the lower will be the
average lending rate demanded by acquired banks.
We use bank balance sheets to derive lending rates for a panel of 200 banks in 10
Eastern European countries for the period 1995-2003. Using panel data estimation meth-
ods, we ¯nd empirical support for our results. Consistent with previous literature, we
¯nd that foreign bank presence negatively impacts bank interest rates. Foreign banks,
on average, charge lower lending rates - between 1.33 and 1.48 percent less than their
domestic counterparts. By including (non-linear) age dynamics into our regression equa-
tion, we ¯nd that although green¯eld banks charge higher interest rates on average, they
signi¯cantly reduce their interest rates over the years following entry. We further ¯nd
indications of a di®erential competition e®ect. Depending on the mode of entry, domes-
tic bank lending rates are lower when entry predominantly happened via a green¯eld
investment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the related
literature. A model of bank market entry is presented in section 3. We derive the credit
contract o®ered in the case of a green¯eld investment and in the case of acquisition.
We discriminate between interest rates demanded from new applicants and incumbent
¯rms. Based on the comparison of the interest rates under di®erent entry mode regimes,
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model for banks operating in 10 Eastern European countries. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature
This paper is related to both the theoretical and empirical literature of foreign bank entry.
The theoretical literature has highlighted the problems of asymmetric information in
lending that new entrants face relative to incumbent banks, which makes credit markets
not easily contestable. Dell'Ariccia, Friedman and Marquez (1999) show that when
entrant banks are unable to distinguish between good and bad borrowers, foreign bank
entry comes to a standstill. They develop a model in which two banks possess private
information about the customers whom they ¯nanced in the past. When new ¯rms
enter the credit market, neither bank has information about their type. In a ¯rst step,
Dell'Ariccia et al. (1999) demonstrate that the smaller of the two banks makes zero
expected pro¯t. This result is used to show that a new entrant would make an expected
loss, because it faces a higher share of unpro¯table ¯rms switching from the incumbent
bank to the new entrant which has less information.1
Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2004) extend the model and assume that one of the lenders
possesses an informational advantage. They study the case where the bank with less in-
formation capital has a cost advantage in extending credit. They show that spreads are
higher in markets characterized by more severe information asymmetries. As a conse-
quence, it is pro¯table to ¯nance borrowers of lower pro¯tability. If an uninformed lender
with lower costs enters, the incumbent bank reacts and ¯nds it more pro¯table to lend
to ¯rms in more opaque sectors. In contrast to Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2004), we
assume that all banks have identical cost structures. In addition, foreign banks di®er
from domestic banks because they are able to screen applicants. Thus, we model the
advantage of foreign banks more explicitly.2 Furthermore, we compare di®erent modes
of bank entry whereas Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2004) restrict their analysis to bank
entry through a green¯eld investment.
Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) empirically analyze how foreign bank participation
and market concentration a®ect bank spreads in a sample of ¯ve Latin American countries
during the late 1990s. Their results suggest that foreign banks are able to charge lower
spreads than domestic banks.3 Furthermore, they ¯nd that acquired banks have relatively
higher spreads than foreign de novo banks. The authors give two possible explanations
of why green¯eld banks charge lower spreads compared to the acquired banks. First,
green¯eld banks may be more concerned with gaining market share compared to foreign
1Gehrig (1998) obtains a similar result; namely that the incumbent monopolistic bank has an incentive
to improve its screening technology in order to deter entry by foreign banks.
2In Sengupta (2005) the new entrant has lower costs and o®ers collateralized credit contracts to match
the incumbent's information advantage.
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borrowers. Second, due to di®erences in initial informational conditions, both types of
banks might not be able to charge the same spreads. More speci¯cally, as is argued by
Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2004), de novo banks will have little information on domestic
borrowers and will thus focus on more transparent (and thus more competitive) market
segments.4
The empirical facts about bank market entry di®er substantially between developing
and industrialized countries. Eastern Europe is a region with one of the highest shares
of foreign participation in the banking sector (Papi and Revoltella (2000)). In the new
EU member states, the share of foreign banks in total banking sector assets amounted
to about 55 percent in 2003. This was at a time when foreign banks were almost absent
in the large EU-15 countries (ECB, 2005). This is surprising, because there are no
formal restrictions on bank market entry. Interestingly, foreign-owned banks in developed
countries are less pro¯table than domestic banks (IMF, 2000).5 Rather the opposite
situation is found in developing countries. Foreign ownership in these countries increased
signi¯cantly during the last decade and a majority of assets is now owned by foreign
banks. Furthermore, foreign banks have a higher pro¯tability than domestic banks in
developing markets (Claessens, DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and Huizinga (2001)).
Some studies focus on the pro¯tability and e±ciency of foreign banks in Eastern Eu-
rope. Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel (2005) analyze whether privatization improves bank
performance for the 10 largest banks in 6 transition countries of Eastern Europe. Their
results indicate that foreign-owned banks are most e±cient (see also Weill (2003)). Ma-
jnoni, Shankar and Vµ arhegyi (2003) investigate how foreign ownership a®ects banks' cost
and pro¯t e±ciency in Hungary. They ¯nd that green¯eld banks are more pro¯table than
acquired banks, because they o®er a wider range of ¯nancial services. Using both bank
and ¯rm level data, Giannetti and Ongena (2005) study the impact of foreign bank entry
in Eastern Europe on ¯rms' access to credit. They ¯nd that ¯rms bene¯t from the pres-
ence of foreign banks, especially large domestic ¯rms. In contrast, De Haas and Naaborg
(2005) document that foreign bank entry in Eastern Europe has not led to a persistent
bias of credit supply towards large multinational corporations. Instead, increased com-
petition and the improvement in lending technologies led to a gradual expansion towards
the SME and retail markets. Naturally, foreign bank lending behavior will depend on the
legal environment of the host country in which it operates. Haselmann, Pistor and Vig
(2005) show that an improvement in the legal protection of creditors in Eastern Europe
is positively related to banks' willingness to lend, especially for foreign banks.
4A similar argument is made by Stein (2002) who argues that banks with more hierarchical structures
- here foreign banks - are more likely to rely on "hard information". A study on banks in 100 emerging
economies con¯rms this di®erence in lending policies between domestic and foreign banks (Mian, 2006b).
5See also De Young and Nolle (1996) and Berger, De Young, Genay and Udell (2000) who ¯nd that
foreign banks are less e±cient than domestic banks in developed markets.
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3.1 Setup of the Model
We study the market entry decision of a bank in a one-period framework. We take
the bank-¯rm relationships which have been established in the past as given. To capture
these e®ects, we use a setup that is similar to that of Dell'Ariccia, Friedman and Marquez
(1999). Before starting the analysis, we describe the characteristics of the borrowers and
the banking sector.
Firms We distinguish between two groups of borrowers. First, there are incumbent
¯rms that have established a bank relationship in the past. Second, there are new ¯rms
that have just entered the credit market. The total number of ¯rms is normalized to 1;
the share of incumbent ¯rms ¹, that of new ¯rms is (1 ¡ ¹). Among the incumbent ¯rms
that already established a bank relationship in the past are successful and old ¯rms which
represent a share of ¼ and (1 ¡ ¼). The \successful ¯rms" possess a track record that
enables them to signal their type. Among the \old ¯rms" a share p will be pro¯table
in the future and will be referred to as \good ¯rms".6 A share (1 ¡ p) will fail, they
are called \bad ¯rms". Through the bank relationship, the incumbent bank has perfect
information about the pro¯tability of the old ¯rms and knows which ¯rm is good or
bad. However, the outside bank cannot discriminate between good and bad old ¯rms
according to their type but knows that a fraction p of the old ¯rms is good. Moreover,
there are \new ¯rms" that enter the credit market. No bank has information about the
type of an individual new ¯rm. It is common knowledge that there is a share of q good
and a share of (1 ¡ q) bad ¯rms among the new ¯rms. All ¯rms that apply for credit
to a certain bank for the ¯rst time are treated as new applicants unless they provide a
track record.7
Successful, old and new ¯rms can invest in new projects. However, only good ¯rms
will succeed and generate a payo® of X with certainty. Bad ¯rms will always fail. In
order to undertake the project, ¯rms need to invest an amount I. Since they do not have
own liquid funds, the investment has to be credit-¯nanced. Figure 1 depicts a game tree
that summarizes the composition of the ¯rm population.
[Figure 1]
6The di®erentiation between old and new ¯rms is independent of the activity of the ¯rm on the
product market. It only refers to the previous relationship with a bank.
7These include all the old ¯rms that apply for credit to the outside bank and all the new ¯rms that
apply for credit. This assumption implies that the foreign bank does not distinguish between new ¯rms
and old ¯rms - i.e. ¯rms that already have a bank relationship - that apply for credit for the ¯rst time.
The distinction between old and new ¯rms is only important with respect to the information that is
revealed to the bank through the bank relationship, irrespective of whether the old ¯rm has already
applied for credit in the past.
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that after bank market entry, there is Bertrand competition on the credit market between
the domestic and the foreign bank.8 The cost of raising funds is equal for both domestic
and foreign banks and is normalized to 0. The domestic bank, which was the incumbent
bank of the incumbent ¯rms, has perfect information about this group of customers. This
assumption can be interpreted as the domestic bank's access to soft information that it
accumulated over the years by, for example, maintaining lending relationships. The
extent to which a foreign bank possesses soft information depends on the mode of entry.
A de novo bank does not have such soft information. Both foreign green¯eld and foreign
acquired banks do however observe - as does the domestic bank - hard information. Other
than the domestic bank, the foreign bank is better able to process this hard information
via a superior screening technology. For modelling purposes, we assume that the domestic
bank does not possess any screening technology as a normalization according to which
we measure how much better a foreign bank is able to evaluate credit proposals than
the domestic bank. The foreign bank's screening technology generates a signal about
the pro¯tability of the ¯rm, which is correct with probability s (s > 0:5). The foreign
bank receives the pro¯tability signal without incurring any additional costs. The idea
behind this is that the foreign bank uses the screening technology it has built in the
home market, in order to limit the losses in the market it has just entered. Incorporating
screening costs needlessly burdens the calculations and does not change the results.
We do not explicitly study collateralization. However, successful ¯rms could be con-
sidered as ¯rms that provide collateral in order to signal their type. We further assume
that no formal information sharing on borrowers' credit histories occurs.9 Moreover, we
assume that banks do not have any constraints in lending capacity.
Timing Before the credit market game starts, the incumbent bank learns the type
of all old ¯rms in its portfolio. There are two rounds in which the banks o®er credit.
First, all banks make o®ers to new applicants. Second, the incumbent bank makes o®ers
to successful and good old ¯rms. New ¯rms apply to both banks in order to increase their
chance to receive a loan. Finally, ¯rms choose which bank to borrow from and invest.
Provided that both banks o®er a loan, ¯rms choose the bank with the lower payo®. If
both banks demand the same repayment, ¯rms apply in proportion to their share in the
population. Old ¯rms stay with their incumbent bank if both the incumbent and the
8Although competition for primary deposits could play a role in the structure of the credit market
(Besanko and Thakor (1987)), we neglect the market situation for deposits and focus on the credit
market. In many transition economies, credit-granting banks are not competing for primary deposits.
Often, former savings banks are still the most important collectors of deposits, which they transfer to
the credit-granting banks through the money market (Dittus and Prowse (1996)).
9For the countries that we include in our empirical analysis, this is a valid assumption in the ¯rst
years under consideration. These countries have only recently adopted some form of formal (public or
private) credit information registry (see Djankov, McLiesh and Schleifer (2005)). We discuss the role of
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they are successful.
There is no equilibrium in pure strategies for the repayment terms. The reason is
that a marginal change in the repayments can lead to a discontinuous change in the
bank's pro¯ts. This is due to the fact that we focus on asymmetric information between
banks. If we incorporate, for example, switching costs, we would be able to derive an
equilibrium in pure strategies (for an example see Boukaert and Degryse (2006)). Since we
want to restrict our attention to the question on how di®erent entry modes in°uence the
expected repayment through di®erences in the distribution of information and di®erences
in screening skills, we do not incorporate switching costs in our analysis.
The lending rate that we derive in the empirical part is the average rate o®ered to
new applicants and incumbent customers. In the theoretical analysis, we ¯rst analyze the
terms of the credit contract o®ered to new applicants. Next, we investigate the lending
behavior of banks vis-a-vis the incumbent customers. We show that bank loan portfolios
depend on the mode of entry. We refer to this e®ect as the \portfolio composition
e®ect". The composition of the loan portfolio subsequently determines how sensitive
bank repayments are to the \competition e®ect". In each step of the analysis, we ¯rst
discuss entry via a green¯eld investment, followed by entry via acquisition and ¯nally
compare the two modes of entry.
3.2 Credit Contract O®ered to New Applicants
3.2.1 Market Entry through Green¯eld Investment
We ¯rst derive the credit contract o®ered by the domestic bank. The domestic bank has
perfect information about all old ¯rms. Therefore, it will only lend to the good old ¯rms
and deny credit to bad old ¯rms since this would imply making an expected loss. Suppose
the domestic bank serves all the new ¯rms that apply for credit. Since it has no screening
skills, the minimal repayment that the domestic bank requires, RD, is determined by the
break even condition when the domestic bank serves the whole market, i.e., when the
domestic bank undercuts the repayment demanded by the foreign bank. Formally, this
condition can be written as:
qR
G







The minimal repayment of the foreign bank, RG
F, is derived by studying the average
quality of ¯rms applying when the foreign bank serves the whole market. The foreign
bank ¯nances all bad old borrowers that have generated a positive signal. Moreover, it
¯nances all new ¯rms with a positive signal. Since the signal is imperfect, a share of
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they are not creditworthy. The break even condition is given by:








+ (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ s)(¡I)
´
= 0 (3)




¹(1 ¡ ¼)(1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ p) + (1 ¡ ¹)(qs + (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ s))
(1 ¡ ¹)sq
(4)
Since the foreign bank has to incur a ¯xed cost K for entering the market, it will
do so only if it makes a positive pro¯t on the credit market. This will be the case if
its minimal repayment satis¯es RG
F < RG
D. This implies that, given RG
D = I
q, the foreign
bank makes positive pro¯ts whenever it serves the whole market.
In equilibrium, banks mix continuously on the range [R;X) or do not bid at all. Given
these minimal repayments, banks decide about their required repayment RG
i , i = D;F,
the cumulative distribution function F G
i and the probability of denying credit probG
i (D).
Proposition 1 shows the resulting equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Proposition 1 If the foreign bank enters through a green¯eld investment, there exists an
equilibrium in mixed strategies where repayments received from new applicants are higher
for the domestic bank compared to the foreign bank:






according to the following cumulative distribution function:
F G







and does not make an o®er with probability probG
D (D) = I (1 ¡ q) 2s¡1
qsX¡2qsI¡I+sI+qI:




, according to the following cumulative distribution function:
F G















Proof. See the Appendix.
From proposition 1 it is easy to note that the value of the domestic bank's cumulative
distribution function is always a fraction s of the foreign bank's cumulative distribution
function, i.e., F G
D (R) = sF G
F (R). Thus, RG
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the one demanded by the foreign de novo bank.
The domestic bank decides not to o®er a credit contract with positive probability
because it faces a so-called \winner's curse problem". All new ¯rms that apply to the
domestic bank are those which were denied credit by the foreign bank after generating
a bad signal. In order to limit the risk to end up with a loss, the domestic bank will
deny credit with a positive probability probG
D (D). This probability increases as the
screening technology of the foreign bank improves. The intuition is that a better screening
technology of the foreign bank deteriorates the average quality of ¯rms that apply to the
domestic bank. In order to avoid losses, the domestic bank therefore rations credit with
a higher probability.
The foreign bank will only enter the market if it has an absolute advantage in terms
of information. When the foreign bank decides to enter, the domestic bank will have
an informational disadvantage compared to the foreign bank with respect to the new
applicant ¯rms. The domestic bank will therefore stay out of the market with positive
probability and with each repayment RG
D make zero expected pro¯t from the new appli-
cant ¯rms. For each repayment the foreign bank makes the same expected pro¯t, which
is given by:
¹(1 ¡ ¼)(1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ p)(¡I) + (1 ¡ ¹)(qs(R
G
D ¡ I) + (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ s)(¡I))
= I ((1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ q)(2s ¡ 1) ¡ ¹(1 ¡ ¼)(1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ p)) (5)
Corollary Foreign banks only enter through green¯eld investment if its screening
skill is high enough, i.e., s > e s =((1¡q+¹q¡¹p¡¹¼+¹¼p)+ K
I )
(2¡2q+2¹q¡¹¡¹p¡¹¼+¹¼p) .
Entry through a green¯eld investment is attractive only if I((1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ q)(2s ¡ 1) ¡
¹(1 ¡ ¼)(1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ p)) > K. Rearranging this condition, we ¯nd that the quality of
the signal generated by screening must exceed e s. Naturally, the higher the ¯xed cost of
market entry, K, the higher e s has to be. The higher I, the amount of credit needed, the
lower is e s. Comparative statics further show that the higher the share of old ¯rms, the
higher the screening quality of the foreign banks must be.
This corollary explains why banks ¯nd green¯eld investment attractive in emerging
markets. In these economies, there are many de novo ¯rms which have not yet established
a bank relationship. Therefore, the share of applicants about which neither foreign nor
domestic banks know the type is high. With respect to the new ¯rms, the foreign bank
has an absolute advantage compared to the domestic bank because it possesses a better
screening technology than the domestic bank. The threshold e s indicates how much better
the foreign bank must be than the domestic bank, which by assumption does not get an
informative signal, as we have normalized the quality of the signal of the domestic bank
to 0.5. Consequently, better screening skills of domestic banks increase e s. This explains
why in industrialized countries, where domestic banks possess sophisticated screening
tools, market entry through green¯eld investment is less attractive for foreign banks.
15
ECB
Working Paper Series No 653
July 20063.2.2 Market Entry through Acquisition
Assume that initially there exist two identical banks. One of the banks is sold to a foreign
bank for a price P A which is exogenously given. When taking over the bank, the foreign
bank acquires information about all the customers of the existing bank. Moreover, it can
implement its screening technology without any costs and screening generates the same
quality of signals as in the case of a green¯eld investment. As before, the domestic bank
has information about the quality of its old customers. Now the acquired banks also has
information about the stock of customers it inherited from the past. One could think
of the credit ¯les it received through the acquisition or the sta® it continues to employ.
The bank sta® possess soft information about the ¯rms that have already established a
bank relationship.
Analogously to the case of green¯eld investment, we determine the minimal repay-
ments necessary for the domestic and the foreign bank, respectively. When serving the
whole market, the break even condition for the domestic bank is determined by the qual-
ity of ¯rms that receive credit. Since the domestic bank does not screen, it serves all
customer that apply, i.e., all bad old customers that are switching bank. The number of
bad old ¯rms that apply to the domestic bank is ¹(1 ¡ ¼)0:5(1 ¡ p)(¡I). Formally, the
break even condition is given by:
¹(1 ¡ ¼)0:5(1 ¡ p)(¡I) + (1 ¡ ¹)(qR
A





2¹(1 ¡ ¼)(1 ¡ p)
(1 ¡ ¹)q
. (7)
In contrast to the domestic bank, the foreign bank screens its applicants. Conse-
quently, the foreign bank ¯nances only those ¯rms that generate a positive signal. The
break even condition is given by:
¹(1 ¡ ¼)0:5(1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ p)(¡I) + (1 ¡ ¹)(qs(R
A
F ¡ I) + (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ s)(¡I)) = 0: (8)





2¹(1 ¡ ¼)(1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ p) + (1 ¡ ¹)((1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ s) + qs)
(1 ¡ ¹)sq
:
It is easy to show that RA
D > RA
F. This implies that the foreign bank has positive
pro¯ts whenever it demands exactly RA
D.10 Since each repayment has to generate the
same expected payo®, the foreign bank makes an expected pro¯t on the credit market.
The foreign bank decides to enter the credit market if the expected pro¯t exceeds the
acquisition price P A.
Proposition 2 describes the equilibrium in mixed strategies in more detail:
10This result is obtained as long as screening produces an informative signal, i.e., s > 0:5. Only then
will the screening capability make the foreign bank relatively stronger compared to the domestic bank.
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in mixed strategies where repayments received from new applicants are higher for the
domestic bank compared to the foreign bank:




(1¡¹)q ;X], according to the following cumulative distribution function:
F A











and does not make an o®er with probability probA
D (D) = 1 ¡ F A
D (X).




(1¡¹)q ;X], according to the following cumulative distribution function:
F A
















= 1 ¡ F A
F (X).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Again, F A
D (R) = sF A
F (R), such that the domestic bank's expected repayment is always
above the one demanded by the acquired bank.
3.2.3 Comparison
We compare what credit contracts look like when a foreign bank enters either through a
green¯eld investment or through acquisition. Since the entry mode determines the degree
of competition, we investigate the competition e®ect here. The results are summarized
in propositions 3 and 4.
Proposition 3 The domestic bank's expected repayments from new applicants are higher
in the case of acquisition than in the case of a green¯eld investment.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In order to study expected repayments, we compare the cumulative distribution func-
tions of repayments for both modes of entry. We can show that both F A












hold. Thus, higher repayments are assigned a
higher probability in the case of acquisition. This is con¯rmed when we look at the prob-
ability that R = X (the probability with which the foreign bank demands the highest
repayment). This probability is higher in the case of acquisition. As a consequence, the
repayment is higher in the case of acquisition. Since the expected repayment demanded
by the domestic bank exceeds the repayment asked by the foreign bank, we obtain the
following result for foreign banks.
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in the case of acquisition than in the case of a green¯eld investment.
Proof. The cumulative distribution function of the domestic bank is always a fraction s of
the foreign bank's cumulative distribution function (see propositions 1 and 2). Therefore,
the comparison of repayments between the two modes of entry is the same as for the
domestic bank.
We have shown that competition is stronger in the case of a green¯eld investment.
The explanation for this result is as follows. The market entry strategy in°uences how
information about old ¯rms is distributed between the two competing banks. In the case
of green¯eld investment, the domestic bank has information about all old ¯rms whereas
the foreign bank does not observe the quality of the good and bad old ¯rms. In contrast,
in the case of acquisition, each bank knows the quality of its old customers. The mode of
entry determines the distribution of information, and, consequently, the position of the
weaker bank. Independent of the mode of entry, the domestic bank is always the weaker
bank. However, the information disadvantage of the domestic bank with respect to the
foreign bank depends on the entry mode. The degree to which the domestic bank has a
disadvantage in terms of information determines the scope of the foreign bank to extract
rents from the ¯rms by demanding a higher repayment.
In the case of a green¯eld investment, the relative position of the domestic bank is
determined by the amount of information it has about its old customers compared to the
screening skills of the foreign bank. The relative position of the domestic bank is weaker
in the case of acquisition compared to the case of green¯eld. Now the foreign bank does
not only possess a better screening technology but has information about old ¯rms as
well. Consequently, the foreign bank is better able to exclude bad old ¯rms from receiving
credit than in the case of green¯eld investment. This also implies that the domestic bank
receives more applications from bad old ¯rms. Due to the lack of screening techniques,
it ¯nances the bad old ¯rms coming from the foreign bank. This means that in the case
of acquisition the domestic bank needs a higher repayment compared to the foreign bank
in order to make zero expected pro¯ts.11
3.3 Credit Contract O®ered to Incumbent Firms
The population of incumbent customers consists of successful ¯rms and old ¯rms. The
incumbent bank can always make an o®er that matches the one o®ered by the outside
bank. The incumbent ¯rms will then demand credit from the bank with which they
already established a relationship. Thus, the outside option of the incumbent ¯rms
determines the repayment that the incumbent bank can demand. Since there is perfect
information on the type of successful ¯rms, there is perfect competition for these ¯rms.
11Along the same line of arguments, the domestic bank rations credit with a higher probability since
it wants to avoid making losses.
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repayment that the incumbent bank demands from good old ¯rms depends on the entry
mode. The incumbent bank does not provide credit to bad old ¯rms in order to avoid
making expected losses. The relative impact of the competition e®ect for new applicants
on average lending rates depends on the portfolio composition of the banks. We show
that the mode of entry generates a di®erential portfolio composition e®ect.
3.3.1 Market Entry through Green¯eld Investment
The incumbent ¯rms that apply to an outside bank face the risk of not receiving an o®er.
If a good old ¯rm which had a relationship with the domestic bank asks for credit at the
foreign de novo bank, it is rejected with probability (1¡s). This is the probability with
which the screening generates an incorrect signal. In this case, the domestic bank is the
only bank that is willing to lend. It exerts its market power by demanding R = X. If the
foreign bank makes an o®er, the domestic bank adapts its o®er to the outside o®er and
demands RG
F as well. As a result, a foreign de novo bank does not possess incumbent
customers. Proposition 5 characterizes the average repayment of the domestic bank.
Proposition 5 If the foreign bank enters through a green¯eld investment, the domestic





and good old ¯rms.
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.3.2 Market Entry through Acquisition
In contrast to the previous case, the foreign bank now possesses a customer base. Good
old ¯rms from the acquired bank have the chance to apply to the domestic bank. However,
the domestic bank only o®ers credit with probability F A
D (X). With probability probA
D (D)
the domestic bank does not make an o®er at all. In this case, the foreign bank is able
to act like a monopolist. Proposition 6 characterizes the average repayment of both the
domestic and the acquired bank.
Proposition 6 If the foreign bank enters through acquisition:
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3.3.3 Comparison
The average lending rate that we observe in the data depends on the competition e®ect
and the portfolio composition e®ect. We compare the repayments o®ered to the new
applicants relative to the repayments o®ered to the incumbent ¯rms in order to evaluate
how the two e®ects are related to each other.
Domestic bank In Proposition 3 we have shown that a domestic bank demands
more from its new applicants if the foreign bank enters through acquisition rather than
through a green¯eld investment. From propositions 5 and 6 it follows that the domestic
bank also demands less from its incumbent customers in the case of green¯eld investment.
We therefore obtain the following result about the domestic bank's average repayment.
Proposition 7 The domestic bank demands lower average repayments if market entry
is through green¯eld investment rather than through acquisition.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The fact that market entry through green¯eld investment reduces the domestic bank's
repayments relatively more compared to entry via acquisition follows from the compe-
tition e®ect. Since competition is more intense in the case of a green¯eld investment,
the repayments that the domestic and the foreign bank demand from new applicants
decreases more strongly. The repayment that the foreign bank o®ers to new applicants
determines the repayment that the domestic bank o®ers to good old customers. Thus,
competition drives down lending rates for new applicants and good old ¯rms. Since
the rates for both types of customers decrease, the di®erent composition of the domes-
tic bank's loan portfolio in the case of a green¯eld investment and acquisition does not
matter for the comparison.
Foreign bank From the previous analysis we know that acquired banks demand
higher repayments from new applicants than green¯eld banks. In order to derive a predic-
tion on the average lending rate (received from incumbent customers and new applicants)
we compare the repayment that an acquired bank o®ers to incumbent ¯rms with the re-
payment that a green¯eld bank o®ers to new applicants. Proposition 8 describes the
result.
Proposition 8 The competition and the portfolio composition e®ect work in di®erent
directions for foreign banks. The competition e®ect reduces the average repayment of the
green¯eld bank compared to that of an acquired bank. However, the portfolio composition
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repayment of the green¯eld bank.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 8 indicates that, depending on the relative share of successful ¯rms, ac-
quired banks may charge lower lending rates compared to green¯eld banks, on average.
The result of the comparison depends on the two opposing e®ects. On the one hand,
acquired banks have successful ¯rms in their portfolio which pay low interest rates. On
the other, competition is less intense than in the case of a green¯eld investment. There-
fore, the interest rate that an acquired bank o®ers to good old ¯rms and new applicant
¯rms is higher. The higher the share of successful ¯rms the more likely it is that the
repayment of the green¯eld bank is higher than the repayment of the acquired bank.
4 Empirical Validity of the Model
4.1 Estimation strategy
The propositions presented above lead to a number of empirically veri¯able hypotheses
for observed lending rates:
² Hypothesis 1:Foreign banks charge lower rates than domestic banks, on average.
Due to better screening skills, foreign banks are able to undercut the domestic
banks' lending rates, irrespective of their mode of entry.
We include a variable Foreign Bank to test whether foreign and domestic bank
lending rates signi¯cantly di®er. Foreign Bank is a dummy variable that is one for
banks that are already foreign owned at from the start of the sample (1995).
² Hypothesis 2: Acquired banks o®er higher lending rates to new applicants than
green¯eld banks. The acquired bank lending rate o®ered to incumbent ¯rms is
however below the rate o®ered to new applicants. Therefore, depending on the
loan portfolio composition of the acquired and the domestic banks, the average
expected repayment of foreign green¯eld (E(RG)), domestic (E(RD)) and foreign-
acquired banks (E(RA)) can be ranked either as
{ E(RG) < E(RD) < E(RA) or as
{ E(RG) > E(RD) > E(RA).
The higher the share of successful ¯rms the more likely it is that the lending rate
of the green¯eld bank is higher than the average lending rate of both the domestic
and the acquired bank. We include Foreign MA and Foreign Green¯eld to test
whether foreign acquired and foreign green¯eld banks charge lower rates compared
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that a foreign bank acquires a domestic bank within the sample period and obtains
a majority ownership share. Foreign Green¯eld is a dummy variable that is one
from the moment that a bank entered during the sample period as a foreign de
novo bank. We interact the mode of entry variables with the age of the bank
to account for age dynamics. As foreign banks become more acquainted with the
market, di®erences in information asymmetries will gradually disappear. Moreover,
domestic banks will bene¯t from positive spill-over e®ects following entry and invest
in better screening technologies. We therefore expect that lending rates converge
as banks grow older.
² Hypothesis 3: Foreign bank entry negatively impacts domestic bank lending rates,
irrespective of the mode of entry.
Due to increased competition, lending rates for new applicants decrease and the
hold-up problem that old ¯rms face will be signi¯cantly reduced. We include For-
eign bank share, the ratio of foreign loans to total market loans, to test for the
competition e®ect. We expect a signi¯cant negative impact of foreign bank market
share on domestic bank lending rates.
² Hypothesis 4: The negative impact of foreign bank entry on domestic bank lending
rates is more pronounced when a majority of foreign banks entered via a green¯eld
investment.
Domestic banks reduce their interest rates for good old ¯rms and new applicants
more when foreign banks enter through a green¯eld investment. To test this di®er-
ential competition e®ect, we di®erentiate foreign bank market share in loans and
de¯ne Bank share of Foreign MA versus Bank share of Foreign Green¯eld. We
expect a larger negative impact on domestic bank lending rates following entry via
green¯eld investment.
In what follows, we analyze the impact of the mode of foreign bank entry on a measure
for the lending rate, while controlling for a number of variables. In particular, we estimate
regressions of the following form:
r
L
i;j;t = ¯0 + ¯1 ¢ Foreign Banki;j + (9)
¯2 ¢ Foreign MAi;j;t +
¯3 ¢ Foreign Greenfieldi;j;t +
¯4 ¢ Foreign Bank Sharej;t +
¯5 ¢ CONTROLS +
Country FE + Y ear FE + "i;j;t:
The dependent variable is the (nominal) lending rate, de¯ned as:
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with RIi;j;t interest income and Li;j;t the volume of loans for each bank i in country j at
time t, taken from the Bankscope database. Because we are dividing a °ow variable by
a stock variable, we use the average of the stock variable between t and t ¡ 1. Next to
variables that capture the mode of entry, we control for a number of bank and country-
speci¯c variables that are expected to determine bank lending rates. De¯nitions and
sources of all these variables are described in table 1.
[Table 1]
Since we are interested in explaining how bank lending rates vary over time within
a country, we include country ¯xed e®ects. To account for the macroeconomic devel-
opments within a country, we include measures for GDP growth, in°ation and the real
short term interest rate. Any other year ¯xed e®ects that may not have yet been ac-
counted for can be captured by including year dummies. We show estimation results that
both include and exclude year ¯xed e®ects in our regressions for the following reasons.
First, since we include time-varying country macro-variables, we already account for time
dynamics per country. Second, because we want to asses the impact of the ownership
and credit registry dummies on average lending rates, there is a potential problem in
disentangling the impact of these variables when time ¯xed e®ects are also included.
This is because many credit registries were installed in the second half of the nineties,
which corresponds with the later years of our sample period. Furthermore, many foreign
acquisitions occurred in the later part of our sample. These events therefore create a cor-
relation between the Foreign MA, Bank share Foreign MA, Foreign bank share and Credit
Registry variables and the time ¯xed e®ects that is negative in the ¯rst years and positive
afterwards (this can be seen in the correlation table in the Appendix). Furthermore, we
want to test for more complex dynamics, such as the impact of the bank's age on lending
rates, depending on ownership, that cannot be captured by including year ¯xed e®ects.
In the presentation of our results, we therefore also show the results of the speci¯cations
that additionally include year ¯xed e®ects as a robustness check to document how our
results are a®ected.
4.2 Descriptive statistics and sample properties
We use yearly data of about 200 individual banks in 10 Eastern European transition coun-
tries, namely Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia for the period (1995-2003). These countries have
shown widely di®erent policies towards the mode of foreign bank entry. Table 2 presents
the means of the variables used for estimation. Foreign bank participation in the sample
encompasses 15% of foreign banks that are foreign from the start of the sample (with an
average market share of 41%), 20% of foreign acquisitions (with a market share of 28%)
and 5% foreign de novo banks (with a market share of 5%). Figure 2 indicates that in the
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de novo bank. In our data window (1995-2003) foreign acquisition eventually became the
more popular mode of entry. Panel A indicates that a large proportion of the original
foreign banks in our sample were initiated as green¯eld investments. Panel B shows that
foreign acquired bank market shares however dominate green¯eld bank market shares
since 1997. Together with a wave of foreign acquisitions, bank markets became more and
more concentrated. On average, the market share of the top 3 banks per country amount
to almost 60 percent. The mode of entry variables used for estimation are de¯ned within
the sample, such that we can adequately assess the impact of entry, depending on the




Table 3 presents the estimation results for equation (9) that includes all banks. The
¯rst three columns show estimates that are based on ordinary least squares regressions
that include country ¯xed e®ects. The last three columns additionally include year ¯xed
e®ects. From equation (I) it follows that (1) foreign banks, on average, charge lower
lending rates - about 1:33% less than domestic banks;12(2) foreign acquired banks charge
about 0:21% less (although this is not signi¯cantly di®erent from domestic banks in
general), while foreign green¯eld banks charge, on average, 0:96% more than domestic
banks.13 When we include linear age dynamics in equation (II), we can derive that in the
¯rst year after entry, foreign green¯eld banks charge about 4% more than domestic banks,
while foreign acquired banks only charge 0:55% more in the ¯rst year after acquisition.
Both types of foreign banks signi¯cantly reduce their lending rates a couple of years
after entry. Equation (III) on the other hand indicates that green¯eld banks may be
characterized by non-linear age dynamics and signi¯cantly reduce their lending rates at
a faster pace than acquired banks. The lower average age of acquired banks does not allow
us to ¯nd a signi¯cant non-linear age e®ect for this mode of entry. Figure 3 summarizes
how foreign bank lending rates evolve in the years after entry, relative to domestic bank
lending rates.
[Figure 3]
Our results further indicate that a higher foreign bank share in loans negatively
impacts the average lending rate, which supports the competition e®ect. This ¯nding
corroborates previous empirical literature (Martinez Peria and Mody (2004), Claessens
12This ¯nding is in line with the result by Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2004), namely that if an unin-
formed lender with lower costs enters, the incumbent bank reacts and ¯nds it more pro¯table to lend to
¯rms in more opaque sectors.
13We additionally investigated the impact of mergers between two foreign banks on lending rates, but
this was never signi¯cant. These results are available upon request.
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year ¯xed e®ects.
In order to be able to fully disentangle the impact of foreign green¯eld banks on bank
lending rates, we include the number of banks as a control variable. Although we do
not consider the total number of banks as a good proxy for competition, it may bias
our results with respect to the Foreign Green¯eld dummy when leaving this out of the
estimation. The results indicate that a higher number of banks leads to higher bank
lending rates. This is surprising at ¯rst, but can be explained as follows. Even though
the countries in our sample have been characterized by an in°ow of green¯eld banks in
the early 1990s, most bank entry happened via foreign acquisitions afterwards (see Figure
2). Moreover, a number of failures and mergers led to a gradual reduction of the number
of banks in the later years of our sample. The process of consolidation has therefore
likely led to a reduction in lending rates, due to e±ciency gains.
[Table 3]
Table 4 presents the results of separate regressions for domestic and foreign banks.
The coe±cients for Foreign MA and Foreign Green¯eld show the di®erence in average
lending rates relative to banks that are already foreign owned in 1995. The results
in equations (II) and (IV) indicate that foreign de novo banks charge higher lending
rates than foreign acquired banks. Taken together, the results from Table 3 and Table
4 indicate that the loan portfolio composition e®ect dominates the competition e®ect.
Speci¯cally, green¯eld banks may be predominantly serving new applicants, while do-
mestic and foreign acquired banks still serve a large share of old and successful ¯rms.
14
Some important di®erences between foreign and domestic banks emerge. Bank-
speci¯c credit growth is positive and signi¯cant for foreign banks. Credit growth can
be seen as an (imperfect) proxy for the relative share of new ¯rms with respect to incum-
bent ¯rms. A large share of new ¯rms may allow foreign banks to charge higher lending
rates, because foreign banks have a screening advantage over domestic banks, while do-
mestic banks e.g. ration credit. Alternatively, foreign banks may be better able to price
the increased risk that follows from credit expansions. We include the loans-to-assets
ratio to control for the fact that some banks (notably domestic banks) may be investing
solely in government bonds, what would lead to an increase in their interest revenues.
However, the share of loans to assets does not in°uence foreign and domestic bank lend-
ing rates di®erently.15 Costs in itself are important for all banks, but more so for foreign
banks. Bank market share increases foreign bank lending rates, while domestic banks do
not seem to be able to exploit market power.
The results in Table 3 did not reveal any signi¯cant impact of market concentration
14Since we are unable to distinguish the share of successful ¯rms, we cannot directly control for banks'
portfolio composition with respect to old and new ¯rms. When we add as a proxy for the share of
successful ¯rms the share of bad loans in a country, our results remain unaltered.
15We additionally tested the impact of government securities on bank lending rates, but these results
were never signi¯cant. These results are available upon request.
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market leads to lower foreign interest rates but it does not impact domestic banks' lend-
ing rates. On the one hand, highly concentrated markets may render competition less
intense, which may lead to higher lending rates (Berger, 1995). On the other, highly
concentrated markets may be the result of a consolidation process in which banks with
superior management or production technologies have lower costs and subsequently can
o®er more competitive interest rates on loans, leading to a negative relationship between
market concentration and lending rates. The high concentration of foreign banks - that
are generally more e±cient and more pro¯table (Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) and
Bonin et al. (2005)) - may therefore be responsible for the observed negative relation
between concentration and lending rates.
Finally, the incorporation of a credit registry does not lead to signi¯cantly lower
interest rates. This indicates that information sharing via the incorporation of credit
registries has not yet signi¯cantly reduced the degree of asymmetric information in the
countries included in our analysis.
[Table 4]
The competition e®ect coming from the presence of foreign banks is especially im-
portant for the domestic banks. In Table 5, we investigate hypothesis 4, namely whether
there is a di®erential competition e®ect on domestic bank lending rates, depending on
the mode of entry. The results in equation (II) indicate that a one percent increase in
foreign de novo market share would lead to a reduction in domestic bank average lending
rates of 0:17% compared to a reduction of 0:13% of a one percent increase in foreign
acquired market share. These results indicate that competition is more intense when
entry predominantly happened via a green¯eld investment, although the two coe±cients
only marginally signi¯cantly di®er.
[Table 5]
5 Concluding Remarks
We analyzed the question how the entry mode of foreign banks in°uences the credit
market in the host country, particularly the lending rate. Since access to ¯nance and
the cost of ¯nancing are important factors in°uencing the development of the corporate
sector, foreign bank entry receives a lot of attention from policy makers (EBRD, 2005).
This paper investigates the impact of foreign bank entry on the costs of ¯nancing. In
a theoretical model, we have shown that the mode of entry determines the distribution of
information between foreign and domestic banks, which a®ects the degree of competition.
Therefore, the mode of entry generates a di®erential competition e®ect. We also take
into account that a bank's portfolio composition of new applicants and incumbent ¯rms
depends on the mode of entry. In contrast to new applicants, successful incumbent ¯rms
can signal their type. For these ¯rms, competition drives down the interest rate. Thus,
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rate demanded by acquired banks. The predictions of the theoretical model reveal that
the competition e®ect reduces the lending rates of the domestic bank more strongly if
entry occurred through green¯eld investment. However, the competition e®ect and the
portfolio composition e®ect work in di®erent directions when green¯eld and acquired
banks are compared.
Our empirical analysis shows indications that the competition e®ect is indeed stronger
when entry happened predominantly as a green¯eld investment. This is due to the
competition for new ¯rms. The portfolio composition e®ect however weakens the relative
position of the foreign de novo bank such that the latter demands higher interest rates
compared to domestic and acquired banks as a result. Alternatively, green¯eld banks
may specialize in certain segments of the market in which they can exert market power.
To investigate this hypothesis, we need information on the type of borrowers that each
foreign bank has. We leave these issues for future research.
Concerning the access to credit, we observe a lending boom in most of the 10 countries
of our sample (EBRD, 2005). The lending boom is characterized by extremely high
growth rates of loans made to the private sector. Admittedly, the initial values of ¯nancial
intermediation are very low. The future development will show how sustainable the
growth rates are and how much foreign ownership and the mode of entry matters for the
quality of the loans granted.
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Step 1: We show that old customers stay with their incumbent bank.
² Bad old customers are denied credit by their incumbent bank because they
generate a payo® of 0 < I.
² Due to the sequential nature of o®ers, the foreign bank underbids the domestic
bank marginally (and vice versa) and keeps its good old ¯rms, i.e. RG
F = RG
D,
because the old ¯rms have a slight preference for the incumbent bank.
Step 2: We show that no equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
R
G
D denotes the repayment that the domestic bank needs for making zero expected
pro¯t.





bank has an incentive to marginally undercut RG
D and still make a positive expected




D. The foreign bank has an incentive to undercut
the domestic bank and still make positive expected pro¯t. In this case, the domestic
bank would make an expected loss and, thus, it would be better to make no o®er at
all.





D. The foreign bank has an incentive to marginally undercut the





The foreign bank has an incentive to undercut the domestic bank and still make
positive expected pro¯t. In this case, the domestic bank would make an expected loss





The domestic bank has an incentive to demand a marginally lower repayment than
the foreign bank and make a non-negative pro¯t.
Step 3: We show that F G
D (R) and F G
F (R) are continuous and strictly monotonously







Suppose that F G
j , j = D;F, is discontinuous at R¤, i.e. there exists an atom in
F G
j , then bank i's action of playing R¤ ¡ ² strictly dominates playing R¤ + ²; ² > 0.
Therefore, bank i, i 6= j; i = D;F; will not bid a free-market repayment [R¤;R¤ + ²).
But then bank j can raise its repayment without losing customers, so R¤ cannot be
an optimal action for bank j. Hence, F G
j must be continuous.
Suppose that F G
j is non-increasing over some interval, i.e. there exists an in-
terval (Ra;Rb) µ (R;X) for which fi (R) = 0 8 R²(Ra;Rb). But then
prob(Ri < Rj j Ri = Ra) = prob(Ri < Rj j Ri²(Ra;Rb)); but pro¯ts are strictly
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July 2006higher for Ri > Ra (conditional on winning), so that bank i maximizes its pay-
o® by playing Ri = Rb and hence would never o®er a repayment in the interval. But
then bank j can increase its pro¯ts by playing Rj = Rb¡² with positive probability,
where ² < Rb ¡ Ra, since this will lead to strictly higher pro¯ts than any interest
rate o®er in a neighborhood of Ra. However, this contradicts the assumption that
fi (R) = 0 8 R²(Ra;Rb).
Step 4: We determine the equilibrium in mixed strategies as described in the propo-
sition.










(qR ¡ I) + F
G









The domestic bank will participate only if ¦G










qsR ¡ qR ¡ 2qsI + Is + Iq
qsR ¡ 2qsI ¡ I + Is + Iq








² There is an atom at X in F G
F . However, there cannot exist an atom in both F G
F
and F G
D since then neither F G
F = X nor F G
D = X would be optimal.
² Either the domestic bank or the foreign bank does not always bid on the free
market. As shown below, this has to be the domestic bank. This implies that
its expected pro¯t is zero because each o®er generates the same pro¯t.




D is determined by the con-






















Step 6: We determine the expected pro¯t of the foreign bank.







D) = (1 ¡ s)¹(1 ¡ ¼)((1 ¡ p)(¡I)) + (1 ¡ ¹)(qs(
I
q
¡ I) + (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ s)(¡I))
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G
F > 0, the foreign bank would not enter because it has to cover the ¯xed
cost of market entry K. Thus, it is shown that the domestic bank does not always
bid on the free market and therefore makes zero expected pro¯t.
Step 7: We determine the mixing probabilities.




D(R) = 0 for each repayment.
² For the foreign bank we determine F G
F (R) by setting
¦
G






(qR ¡ I) + F
G































(qs(R ¡ I) + (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ s)(¡I))














D (D) = I (1 ¡ q) 2s¡1
qsX¡2qsI¡I+sI+qI the domestic bank makes no o®er at
all.
Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The ¯rst three steps are analogously to the Proof of Proposition 1.
Step 4: We determine the equilibrium in mixed strategies as described in the propo-
sition.




D(R) = ¹(1 ¡ ¼)(
1
2






(qR ¡ I) + F
A








The domestic bank will participate only if ¦A















(¹I + ¹Ip ¡ 2I + 2qR ¡ 2¹qR + ¹¼I ¡ ¹¼pI)
((1 ¡ ¹)(¡I + Iq + qsR ¡ 2qsI + Is))
¶¶








² There is an atom at X in F A
F . However, there cannot exist an atom in both F A
F
and F A
D since then neither F A
F = X nor F A
D = X would be optimal.
² Either the domestic bank or the foreign bank does not always bid on the free
market. As shown below, this has to be the domestic bank. This implies that
its expected pro¯t is zero because each o®er generates the same pro¯t.




D is determined by the con-
dition that the domestic bank wins the free market with certainty:
¦
A
D (R) = ¹(1 ¡ ¼)
1
2





2¹(1 ¡ ¼)(1 ¡ p)
q (1 ¡ ¹)
Step 6: We determine the expected pro¯t of the foreign bank.

















2¹(1 ¡ ¼)(1 ¡ p)
q (1 ¡ ¹)
¡ I
¶









Thus, it is shown that the domestic bank does not always bid on the free market and
therefore makes zero expected pro¯t. The foreign bank makes positive expected prof-
its since it enters the credit market only if the expected pro¯t exceeds the acquisition
price P A.
Step 7: We determine the mixing probabilities.






D) = 0 for each repayment.
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F (R) by setting
¦
A












(qR ¡ I) + F
A




















= 1 ¡ F A
F (X).





































. With probability probA
D (D) = 1 ¡ F A
D (X) the do-
mestic bank makes no o®er at all.
Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We will show that F A












that the cumulative distribution function of repayments sets higher probability mass
on higher repayments when the bank enter through acquisition instead of green¯eld
investment.








































as (qsX ¡ I + Iq ¡ 2qsI + Is) > 0
(which can be seen from probG
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F (R) < F G
F (R):
FA






















A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
If the foreign bank enters through green¯eld investment, the domestic bank ¯nances ¹¼
successful ¯rms from which it gets a repayment I. It also grants loans to ¹(1 ¡ ¼)p
good old ¯rms. Their repayment depends on their outside option, i.e., on whether they
receive an o®er from the foreign bank. Provided they receive an o®er, which happens with
probability s, they repay RG
F, otherwise they repay X. The total number of incumbent
¯rms ¯nanced by the domestic bank is ¹¼ + ¹(1 ¡ ¼)p. Thus, the expected repayment






A.5 Proof of Proposition 6
In the case of acquisition, successful ¯rms repay I, good old ¯rms that do not get an
outside o®er X. If a good old ¯rm receives an outside o®er, the incumbent bank demands




The foreign bank ¯nances 0:5¹ successful ¯rms and 0:5¹(1 ¡ ¼)p good old ¯rms.







The domestic bank ¯nances 0:5¹ successful ¯rms and 0:5¹(1 ¡ ¼)p good old ¯rms.
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 8
We compare the repayment the acquired bank demands from its incumbent ¯rms with




( ¼(I ¡ E(RG
F)) + (1 ¡ ¼)p(F A
D(X)(E(RA
D) ¡ E(RG
F)) + (1 ¡ F A
D)(X ¡ E(RG
F))) with





² X ¡ E(RG
F) > 0
Q.E.D.
B The role of information sharing
There are two sources responsible for the superior information of incumbent banks. First,
the incumbent bank has lent to ¯rms in the past and thereby can observe their type.
Second, the incumbent bank obtains soft information by having a business relationship,
for example keeping a ¯rm's account.
So far, we assumed that there is no information sharing on the credit history of old
¯rms, i.e., credit registries do not exist. How are our results a®ected when a credit registry
is incorporated? Information sharing implies that there is no asymmetric information
about the old ¯rms' credit history. Old ¯rms that have borrowed in the past can be
identi¯ed as old ¯rms and therefore are no longer pooled with new ¯rms. As a result,
bad old ¯rms will not be ¯nanced since all banks have the information that they are not
creditworthy. Good old ¯rms can show their type to the outside bank. Therefore, there
is perfect competition for good old ¯rms and they no longer face a hold-up problem. As a
result, interest rates for good old ¯rms will decline to the rate demanded from successful
¯rms. Competition for new applicant ¯rms, which now are only new ¯rms, does not
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technology, and therefore remains the \stronger" bank. The information advantage of the
domestic and the acquired bank with respect to old ¯rms is however signi¯cantly reduced.
As a result, the di®erent entry modes converge in terms of information distribution
because the information on old ¯rms' credit history is now publicly available. With
respect to soft information, the incumbent bank keeps its information advantage on
¯rms' creditworthiness.
Overall, the incorporation of a credit registry reduces asymmetric information and
negatively impacts average lending rates for all banks. Moreover, the average quality of
loans granted increases because some of the bad old ¯rms are not ¯nanced any more.
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Variable  Description 
1. The (nominal) lending rate  The share of interest income (flow variable) over loans (stock 
variable). Because we are dividing a flow variable by a stock 
variable, we use the average of the stock variable between t and 
t-1. (%).* 
   
2. Ownership/mode of entry variables.#   
   
a)      Foreign Bank   A dummy that is one for banks that were already foreign-owned 
before the start of the sample. These include all the greenfield 
banks or foreign acquisitions (that resulted in majority foreign 
ownership) that happened before or in 1995. Foreign Bank 
indicates the own effect of bank origin or the own effect of 
foreign bank presence. 
b)      Foreign MA  A dummy that is one from the moment that a foreign bank 
acquires a domestic bank within the sample period and obtains a 
majority ownership share. 
c)      Foreign Greenfield   A dummy that is one from the moment that a bank entered 
during the sample period as a de novo bank with a majority 
foreign ownership share. 
d)     Foreign bank share (%)   The ratio of foreign loans to a country’s total volume of loans. 
This variable measures the competition effect following foreign 
bank entry.* 
  
3. Bank-specific control variables.*   
  
a)      Liquidity (%)   The ratio of liquid to total assets. Liquid assets comprise cash 
and bank deposits, including central bank deposits. High cash 
holdings represent an opportunity cost of holding higher-
yielding assets (e.g. loans) that can increase lending rates. 
b)      Costs (%)   The ratio of total expenses to  average assets. Higher costs will 
lead banks to charge higher lending rates. 
c)      Market share (%)   The share of loans to a country’s total bank loans. Market share 
intends to capture market power. More market power can result 
in higher lending rates. 
d)     Loans-to-assets ratio (%)  The ratio of loans to total assets captures banks’ portfolio 
composition. Banks that have a relatively high share of loans 
are able to charge lower lending rates. 
e)      ∆ Loan loss reserves  The log difference in loan loss reserves with respect to the 
previous year is intended as a proxy for credit risk. A rise in 
credit risk will lead banks to increase their lending rates. 
f)       Capital (%)   The capital-to-assets ratio. Banks need to hold regulatory 
capital as a buffer against credit risk; however, large capital 
holdings are costly for banks. A high capital ratio may 
consequently lead to high lending rates. 
g)      Credit growth   The log difference of loans with respect to the previous year is 
intended to proxy for the demand for new loans. An increasing 
loan demand may lead to higher lending rates. 
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July 2006a)      Top 3 bank share (%)   This variable captures market concentration in loans.* 
b)      Total number of banks  A country’s total number of banks. This variable is included to 
control for the increase in the number of banks following a de 
novo entry.@ 
c)      Credit registry  A dummy variable that equals one from the year of the 
incorporation of a credit registry onward, zero otherwise. The 
incorporation of a credit registry induces a downward shift in 
the overall degree of banking market asymmetry, which is 
expected to lead to lower lending rates.+ 
c)      Inflation (%)   Changes in inflation will be paralleled by changes in the 
nominal lending rate.@ 
d)     GDP growth (%)   The real growth in GDP captures the business cycle and 
represents another loan demand factor.@ 
e)      Real short term interest rate (%)   The real short term interest rate defines a lower bound for bank 
funding and represents another cost.§ 
 
*Source: Fitch/IBCA/BvD/Bankscope. #Source: Central banks, bank annual reports. +Source: Djankov, 
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July 2006Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
(808 Obs)     
Variable     Mean 
    
Lending rate    17.62 
Foreign bank  0.15 
Foreign MA  0.20 
"."*Age   3.34 
"."*Age2   14.64 
Foreign Greenfield  0.05 
"."*Age   5.59 
"."*Age2   34.18 
Foreign bank share  40.80 
Bank share of Foreign MA  27.91 
Bank share of Foreign Greenfield  4.86 
Liquidity   27.44 
∆ Loan loss reserves  45.79 
Costs   10.40 
Market share  7.18 
Loans-to-assets 48.24 
Capital   11.98 
Credit growth  0.23 
Credit Registry  0.56 
Top 3 bank share  59.39 
Total number of banks  37.44 
Inflation   6.17 
GDP growth  3.98 
Real interest rate  4.15 
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  I II II  IV  V  VI 
Dependent variable  Lending rate 
        
Foreign  bank  -1.33** -1.42** -1.45** -1.40** -1.45**  -1.48*** 
  [0.56] [0.57] [0.57] [0.57] [0.57] [0.57] 
Foreign  MA  -0.21  0.92 -0.12 -0.24  0.63 -0.29 
  [0.43] [0.61] [0.77] [0.44] [0.64] [0.79] 
"."*Age   -0.37***  0.33   -0.29*  0.35 
   [0.14] [0.45]   [0.15] [0.47] 
"."*Age2    -0.09    -0.08 
     [0.06]    [0.06] 
Foreign  Greenfield  0.96  4.73*** -6.12  0.74  3.71** -4.75 
  [0.76] [1.75] [3.86] [0.77] [1.80] [3.79] 
"."*Age   -0.69***  3.50**   -0.54**  2.74** 
   [0.23] [1.35]   [0.23] [1.32] 
"."*Age2    -0.37***    -0.29** 
     [0.12]    [0.12] 
Foreign  bank  share  -0.02*  -0.02**  -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
Liquidity  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
∆  Loan  loss  reserves  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Costs  0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 
  [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.08] 
Market  share  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Loans-to-assets -0.23***  -0.23***  -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** 
  [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Capital  0.07***  0.07***  0.07*** 0.06** 0.05** 0.05** 
  [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] 
Credit  growth  1.66** 1.69** 1.66** 1.85** 1.83** 1.77** 
  [0.81] [0.80] [0.80] [0.88] [0.87] [0.86] 
Credit  Registry  -0.5 -0.35 -0.33 -0.07 -0.02 -0.04 
  [0.58] [0.58] [0.59] [0.56] [0.56] [0.57] 
Top  3  bank  share  -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 
  [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] 
Total  number  of  banks  0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 
  [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] 
Inflation  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 
  [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] 
GDP growth  -0.08  -0.07  -0.07  -0.16*  -0.17*  -0.18** 
  [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] 
Real  interest  rate  0.23*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.17***  0.17** 
   [0.07]  [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] 
Country  Dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year  Dummies  no  no  no yes yes yes 
Observations  808 808 808 808 808 808 
N  banks  206 206 206 206 206 206 
R-squared  0.60 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.62 
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  I II  III  IV 
Dependent variable  Lending rate 
        
   Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign 
       
Foreign MA    0.19    0.21 
   [0.44]    [0.43] 
Foreign Greenfield    1.59**    1.41* 
   [0.78]    [0.76] 
Foreign bank share  -0.04**  0.00  -0.01  -0.02 
 [0.02]  [0.01]  [0.02]  [0.01] 
Liquidity 0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00 
 [0.03]  [0.02]  [0.03]  [0.02] 
∆ Loan loss reserves  0.00  -0.00**  0.00  -0.00** 
 [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00] 
Costs 0.20**  0.70***  0.18**  0.67*** 
 [0.09]  [0.09]  [0.08]  [0.09] 
Market share  0.01  0.04***  0.00  0.04*** 
 [0.03]  [0.01]  [0.02]  [0.02] 
Loans-to-assets -0.20***  -0.25***  -0.19***  -0.26*** 
 [0.03]  [0.02]  [0.03]  [0.02] 
Capital 0.07**  0.08**  0.05*  0.08*** 
 [0.03]  [0.03]  [0.03]  [0.03] 
Credit growth  0.78  2.93***  0.42  3.28*** 
 [0.90]  [0.78]  [0.91]  [0.79] 
Credit Registry  -1.35  1.00  -1.19  1.25* 
 [0.98]  [0.68]  [0.90]  [0.69] 
Top 3 bank share  0.00  -0.16**  -0.02  -0.15** 
 [0.05]  [0.07]  [0.05]  [0.06] 
Total number of banks  0.10**  0.24***  0.00  0.27*** 
 [0.05]  [0.06]  [0.06]  [0.07] 
Inflation 0.02  0.16**  -0.07  0.16** 
 [0.05]  [0.07]  [0.06]  [0.08] 
GDP growth  -0.05  -0.17*  -0.33***  -0.12 
 [0.09]  [0.10]  [0.12]  [0.11] 
Real interest rate  0.13  0.21***  -0.02  0.22*** 
   [0.08]  [0.06] [0.09]  [0.07] 
Country Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year Dummies  no  no  yes  yes 
Observations 480  328  480  328 
N banks  139  97  139  97 
R-squared 0.47  0.82  0.51  0.83 
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  I II  II    IV  V  VI 
Dependent variable  Lending rate    
              
  All banks  Domestic  Foreign    All banks  Domestic  Foreign 
Foreign MA  0.21    0.14    0.21    0.17 
 [0.39]    [0.44]    [0.39]    [0.44] 
Foreign Greenfield  1.34*    1.38*    1.1    1.30* 
 [0.69]    [0.77]    [0.68]    [0.77] 
Foreign bank share  0.04  0.09  -0.04    0.05  0.13*  -0.04 
 [0.04]  [0.06]  [0.04]    [0.04]  [0.07]  [0.04] 
Bank share of  -0.07*  -0.13**  0.04    -0.07  -0.14*  0.02 
Foreign  MA [0.04] [0.06]  [0.05]   [0.04] [0.07]  [0.05] 
Bank share of  -0.06  -0.17*  0.12*    -0.03  -0.13  0.07 
Foreign  Greenfield [0.07] [0.09]  [0.06]   [0.07] [0.10]  [0.07] 
Liquidity 0.00  0.00  0.01    0.00  0.01  0.00 
 [0.02]  [0.03]  [0.02]    [0.02]  [0.03]  [0.02] 
∆ Loan loss reserves  0.00  0.00  -0.00**    0.00  0.00  -0.00** 
 [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00]    [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00] 
Costs 0.31***  0.19**  0.72***    0.30***  0.18**  0.68*** 
 [0.09]  [0.09]  [0.09]    [0.09]  [0.08]  [0.09] 
Market share  0.02  0.01  0.04***    0.02  0.00  0.04*** 
 [0.02]  [0.02]  [0.02]    [0.01]  [0.02]  [0.02] 
Loans-to-assets -0.24***  -0.20***  -0.25***   -0.23***  -0.19***  -0.25*** 
 [0.02]  [0.03]  [0.02]    [0.02]  [0.03]  [0.02] 
Capital 0.08***  0.07**  0.08***    0.06**  0.05*  0.09*** 
 [0.02]  [0.03]  [0.03]    [0.03]  [0.03]  [0.03] 
Credit growth  1.63**  0.77  2.93***    1.81**  0.41  3.29*** 
 [0.77]  [0.87]  [0.80]    [0.84]  [0.87]  [0.80] 
Credit Registry  -0.11  -0.76  0.58    0.17  -0.84  0.97 
 [0.56]  [0.86]  [0.77]    [0.54]  [0.79]  [0.79] 
Top 3 bank share  -0.03  0.01  -0.19***    -0.06  -0.02  -0.18*** 
 [0.04]  [0.05]  [0.07]    [0.04]  [0.05]  [0.07] 
Total number of banks  0.17***  0.13**  0.24***    0.14***  0.03  0.26*** 
 [0.04]  [0.05]  [0.06]    [0.05]  [0.06]  [0.08] 
Inflation 0.04  0.02  0.16**    0.02  -0.07  0.16* 
 [0.06]  [0.05]  [0.07]    [0.07]  [0.06]  [0.08] 
GDP growth  -0.1  -0.1  -0.18*    -0.19**  -0.36***  -0.13 
 [0.07]  [0.09]  [0.10]    [0.08]  [0.11]  [0.12] 
Real interest rate  0.23***  0.13  0.22***    0.19***  -0.03  0.24*** 
   [0.07]  [0.08]  [0.07]     [0.07] [0.08]  [0.08] 
Country Dummies  yes  yes  yes    yes  yes  yes 
Year Dummies  no  no  no    yes  yes  yes 
Observations 808  480  328    808  480  328 
N banks  206  139  97    206  139  97 
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July 2006Figure 2: Percentage and market share of foreign banks by mode of entry. 
 








1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Foreign Bank Foreign MA Foreign De Novo
 









1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Foreign bank share Bank share Foreign MA Bank share Foreign De Novo
 
Countries included are Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. Market shares in loans are calculated using Bankscope data. Ownership data is 
taken from Central Banks’ and commercial banks’ annual reports and varies over time. More detailed 
information on variable construction is provided in table 1. 
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July 2006Figure 3: Foreign bank lending rates relative to domestic bank lending rates (years after 
entry). 
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